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Abstract 
A common argument against car use taxes, such as congestion charges and fuel taxes, is that 
they hurt poor groups disproportionately. This chapter discusses this argument, explains 
methodological issues in distributional analyses and summarizes typical empirical findings. 
How distributional effects of a car use tax should be viewed depends on whether the purpose 
of the tax is fiscal or price-correcting (i.e. intended to make the cost of driving better reflect 
social costs). Overall, average payments of car use taxes tend to be approximately 
proportional to income, with a small tendency to regressivity in rich countries and 
progressivity in poor countries. However, there may substantial variation within an income 
group, which may be problematic if a tax primarily has a fiscal purpose. Distributional 
analyses of public revenue sources and public spending should in general be kept separate, 
since the definitions of what constitutes distributional neutrality often differ between taxes 
and expenditures.  
 
Keywords: concentration index; congestion charges; distributional effects; equity; fuel tax; 
Suits index.     
1 Introduction 
Fuel taxes and congestion charges have repeatedly been shown to be highly effective policy 
instruments to reduce traffic emissions and road congestion, respectively. However, a 
recurring argument against them is that they are claimed to fall disproportionately on the 
poor. This chapter analyses this argument. For brevity, I will refer to fuel taxes and 
congestion charges as “car use taxes”. Most of the discussion in the chapter is just as relevant 
for other kinds of car-related taxes, such as vehicle taxes, parking charges and vehicle sales 
taxes.  
 
The purpose of a car use tax matters greatly for what conclusions are drawn. Many car use 
taxes, in particular when fuel taxes were first introduced, have been fiscally motivated: they 
are simply a convenient way to raise revenues for various public expenditures. In such 
situations, it is clear that the taxes’ distributional burden is relevant, and should be compared 
to other ways to raise public revenues, such as income, sales or property taxes. But more and 
more, car use taxes are seen as price corrections: they are motivated by a desire to make the 
cost of driving better reflect its total social cost, including externalities such as carbon 
emissions and road congestion. In other words, this kind of car use tax adjusts the price of 
driving to what it really should be; without it, driving is subsidized from a social point of 
view. From this perspective, it is much less clear in what sense distributional effects of car use 
taxes are relevant, and between which situations comparisons should be made. Prices are 
almost always the same for everyone, regardless of income or wealth, for two good reasons. 
First, it lets the individual decide for herself how to allocate her resources (money, time etc.) 
between different goods and services. Second, it leads to an overall efficient allocation of 
resources across the economy through supply-and-demand mechanisms. Desires for increased 
income equity is instead usually handled by taxation and social welfare systems. Accepting a 
default position where prices are, generally, equal for everyone (with a few deliberated 
exceptions), it is natural to argue that the distributional effects of corrective taxes – taxes 
which are introduced to make the prices “right” in the sense that they reflect full social costs – 
are in fact essentially irrelevant. Indeed, allowing prices of car trips to be lower than their 
social cost (which they will be in the absence of car use taxes) effectively constitutes 
subsidies from society at large to car drivers, and these implicit subsidies accrue mostly to 
rich groups.  
 
This being said, analyzing distributional effects may still be important, partly because most 
car use taxes have at least some fiscal motivation as well, and partly because any change in an 
existing price system causes transition costs when people adapt to the new prices.  
2 Methodological questions  
When analyzing distributional effects of tax instruments, several methodological questions 
need to be considered, most of which have no clear-cut answers.  
2.1 Should revenue recycling be included in the analysis?  
The first question is whether the recycling of the revenues should be part of the analysis. It is 
important to realize that the distributional profile of a revenue-generating tax instrument is 
one thing, and the distributional profile of an expenditure scheme is something else. They can 
be analyzed either separately, or together as a single policy.  
 
One answer is that it depends on the decision context. If the revenues will be spent on 
something that will be carried out in any case, it is natural to compare the distributional 
profiles of different possible tax instruments in isolation, leaving the distributional profile of 
the planned expenditure out of the analysis. On the other hand, if one is considering 
introducing an earmarked tax for a specific project which will not be undertaken otherwise – 
say, a congestion charge necessary to fund an infrastructure investment – it may be natural to 
consider the distributional profile of the tax and the project together, as a single policy.  
 
However, there is a strong argument for analyzing tax instruments and expenditure schemes 
separately, namely that the natural and conventional definitions of what constitutes 
“distributionally neutral” schemes are usually defined differently for taxes and for 
expenditures. 
 
The most common definition of a distributionally neutral tax instrument is one which takes an 
equal share of everyone’s income. A tax instrument is defined as progressive if it takes a 
larger share of rich people’s income than of poor people’s; the opposite is called a regressive 
tax. This notion is formalized in the Suits index, defined as 𝑆 = 1 − 2∫ 𝑇(𝑦)𝑑𝑦ଵ଴ , where 𝑦 is 
the cumulative share of total income and 𝑇(𝑦) is the cumulative share of the total tax burden1. 
The index is bounded between -1 and 1. A flat-rate tax has Suits index 0, a regressive tax has 
a negative Suits index and a progressive tax a positive index.  
 
For public expenditures, on the other hand, the most common2 definition of a distributionally 
neutral scheme is one which gives an equal absolute amount (or value) to everyone, a so-
called lump sum distribution. An expenditure scheme is defined as progressive if it gives a 
larger amount per capita to poor people than to rich people, and regressive if it is the other 
way around. This notion is formalized in the concentration index, defined as 𝐶𝐼 = 1 −
2∫ 𝑠(𝑥)𝑑𝑥ଵ଴  where 𝑠(𝑥) is the share of total spending accruing to the poorest 𝑥 percent of the 
population. The concentration index is also bounded between -1 and 1, just as the Suits index. 
If all citizens receive the same amount (lump sum spending), the index is zero. Progressive 
spending (more is spent per capita on low income groups) yields a negative concentration 
index, and vice versa.  
 
Now, note that the definitions of distributional neutrality are different for taxes and 
expenditures: a neutral tax takes an equal share of everyone’s income, while a neutral 
spending scheme gives an equal absolute amount to everyone. This easily leads to paradoxical 
results when analyzing combinations of a tax and a revenue recycling scheme as a single 
policy. For example, combining a neutral tax (a fixed share of everyone’s income) with a 
neutral expenditure scheme (a lump-sum redistribution) turns out to be a progressive policy 
                                               
1 In applications, data is usually given in discrete form for individuals or groups. Indexing these discrete 
observations by 𝑖, the Suits index is approximated by 𝑆 = 1 − ∑ ൫𝑇(𝑦௜) + 𝑇(𝑦௜ିଵ)൯(𝑦௜ − 𝑦௜ିଵ)௜ . 
2 There are studies and contexts, however, where neutral spending is defined as a scheme where each individual 
gets an amount proportional to her income.    
when seen as a combined policy, not a neutral one. It follows that it is easy to construct 
examples where a regressive tax combined with a regressive spending scheme is defined as a 
progressive policy when taken together and viewed as a single scheme, and vice versa: a 
progressive tax and a progressive spending scheme may be regressive when taken together. 
This is a strong argument for analyzing distributional effects of tax schemes and expenditure 
schemes separately, since this prevents this kind of confusion.  
 
It is not uncommon that studies conclude that a car use tax is regressive, but together with 
lump-sum revenue recycling the total effect is progressive. This mixes the two different 
definitions of “progressive”/”regressive” explained above, ending up in a conclusion that is 
completely trivial on a closer look. Taking an equal share of everyone’s income (a neutral tax) 
and handing the revenues back with a lump-sum distribution (neutral spending) is of course a 
highly progressive policy combination to start with. That a tax instrument is not regressive 
enough to make the combination with a lump-sum redistribution regressive is hardly 
surprising; if such a combination was regressive, the tax has to be extremely regressive in 
itself, effectively taking higher equal amounts in absolute terms from poor people than from 
rich people. Again, this shows that there are strong arguments for keeping distributional 
analyses of public revenue sources and public expenditures separate. In certain specific 
decision situations, however, it may still be natural to also consider a combined tax and 
spending scheme; the most common example is a car use tax earmarked for a project that will 
for certain not be undertaken otherwise.   
2.2 Income or expenditures as a measure of economic status?  
The second methodological question is how to define and measure individuals’ available 
economic resources. One way is to simply use disposable income, i. e. the net sum of after-tax 
wages and transfers in a month or a year. However, this ignores that many people have other 
sources of money available to them. People may live off their savings or other sources of 
wealth, be supported by relatives (parents or a spouse), or have unregistered income sources. 
Moreover, some people may expect to have higher earnings in the future than they currently 
have, leading them to behave as if they borrow against their future income; this is especially 
relevant for students. Finally, income varies a lot between years, especially at the extremes. 
For example, someone selling a house or a company one year will have a very high income 
that particular year, but probably not nearly as high the next year. At the other extreme, some 
people may have extremely low incomes one particular year because they take a year off to 
study, take care of children or write a book, but in such cases their income are probably 
considerably higher other years. All this means that disposable income, in the usual sense, is 
not necessarily a full and fair measure of an individual’s economic situation.  
 
A way around this is to use individuals’ expenditures as a proxy measure of their long-run 
available economic resources. An obvious drawback is that such studies must be based on 
survey data rather than registry data, and registry data usually gives much bigger and more 
precise data sets. Studies suggest that using expenditures rather than disposable income as a 
measure of economic resources tends to make tax instrument look more neutral – progressive 
taxes become less progressive, and regressive taxes less regressive.  
2.3 Must behavioral adaptation be taken into account?  
A change in car use taxes will cause behavioral changes. This means that the welfare loss of a 
tax change will be accurately reflected neither by the total taxes paid after the change, nor by 
what would have been paid ignoring behavioral adaptation. The first alternative 
underestimates the welfare loss of a tax increase, since it ignores the loss in utility caused by 
adapting behavior, and conversely the second alternative overestimates the welfare loss since 
it ignores the possibility to adapting and hence partly avoiding the tax. It follows that only 
measuring the tax incidence, i.e. how much tax different groups pay, may give misleading 
conclusions, since this neglects the welfare loss of behavioral adaptation.  
 
Clearly, it is preferable to use a proper welfare measure – the Marshallian or ideally the 
Hicksian consumer surplus (see the chapter by Harald Minken in this volume) – rather than 
simply using taxes paid. However, this is not always possible, since it requires forecasting 
behavioral adaptions to the tax. Fortunately, the error induced by neglecting adaptation costs 
is usually relatively small. If a tax is increased by some fraction 𝛼 and the cost elasticity of 
demand is 𝜀, the relative error of the welfare loss if adaption is ignored is ఈఌ
ଶ
. So, if a tax is 
increased by 𝛼 = 10% and the cost elasticity is 𝜀 = −0.5, the relative error is 2.5%, which is 
negligible in most situations. Obviously, if the change is relatively large and demand 
elasticities are high and different across groups, the different between welfare loss and change 
in taxes paid may not be negligible anymore.  
2.4 Must second-order effects be taken into account? 
A change in car use taxes may change the prices of other goods and services as a second-order 
effect. This could mean that even individuals who do not travel by car are affected, since the 
prices of goods and services they consume may change. One case where this can matter is the 
price of public transport in poor countries, since diesel costs make up a substantial share of 
transit operating costs and poor groups make a much higher share of their trips by public 
transport than by car. This means that neglecting the second-order effect of a fuel tax increase 
on public transport prices, only considering the direct effect on driving costs, may 
underestimate the impact on poor groups. 
3 Two examples 
Consumption taxes are usually slightly regressive, since high income groups tend to spend a 
smaller share of their income on consumption, and more on e.g. savings. General sales taxes 
typically have Suits indices in the range -0.1 to -0.2. Whether a consumption tax on a 
particular good is progressive or regressive depends on whether consumption of that good 
increases faster or slower than proportionally to income. In other words, a consumption tax 
will be regressive if the consumption elasticity with respect to income is lower than 1, and 
vice versa.  
 
Broadly speaking, studies suggest that the income elasticity of car use is slightly lower than 1 
in rich countries and slightly higher than 1 in poor countries. This means that car use taxes 
tend to be mildly regressive in rich countries but mildly progressive in poor countries. 
Obviously, results will differ depending on the design of the tax, the context, what type of car 
use is taxed and so on.  
 
To illustrate some fairly typical results and how distributional analyses can be carried out, two 
empirical case studies are presented below: a fuel tax increase and a congestion charge. While 
the specific results obviously pertain to these specific cases, the reasoning is general, and the 
general findings are fairly representative for most studies.  
3.1 Example: Fuel tax 
The following case study shows results for an (approximately) 10% increase of the Swedish 
fuel tax (reported in Eliasson, Pyddoke and Swärdh (2018)). Distributional impacts are 
calculated as welfare losses relative to disposable income, where incomes are taken from the 
tax registry. Driving distances are taken from the vehicle registry, and vehicles’ fuel 
consumption from vehicle type registrations. Welfare losses are calculated using demand 
elasticities estimated separately for different combinations of income quartile and type of 
residential area (large cities, small cities and rural areas). Elasticities are medium-term, 
meaning that they consider changes in vehicle kilometers driven, but not changes in 
residential location or changes in vehicle characteristics (fuel consumption). Revenue 
recycling is not considered. Results are presented for combinations of income octiles and 
residential area.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the welfare loss increases as a share of disposable income for most of the 
income range (octile 2-7). The pattern is different for octiles 1 and 8, however. The result for 
octile 1 should be treated with caution; most incomes in this group are well below the 
threshold for social welfare in Sweden and therefore cannot really reflect individuals’ real 
access to money. In octile 8, incomes are so high that car use cannot reasonably increase in 
proportion to income. The regressivity/progressivity of the fuel tax increase is hence different 
across the income distribution: between octile 2 and 7 it is progressive, but in the low and 
high tails it is regressive. The Suits index for the entire income range shows that the fuel tax 
increase is slightly regressive overall; this is caused by the result for the highest octile. This 
also hints at why a fuel tax is often slightly regressive in rich countries, but progressive in 
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poor countries: in rich countries, car use in the highest income groups tend to reach a 
saturation level above which car use only increases slowly when income increases further. 
This means that a fuel tax’ share of income decreases in the highest income segments.  
 
The variation in paid fuel tax across income groups is mostly due to differences in car 
ownership, and not so much due to differences in car owners’ driving distances or vehicles’ 
fuel consumption. This means that if one (for some reason) would consider only car owners, a 
fuel tax would be strongly regressive.  
 
 
Figure 1. Welfare loss of the fuel tax increase, relative to income, by type of residential location.  
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Figure 1 also shows that there are considerable differences between large cities, small cities 
and rural areas. A more detailed analysis of shows that residents in satellite cities, which serve 
as “suburbs” to a region’s functional center, pay more in fuel taxes, and that such functional 
relationships between cities explains more of the variation than just population sizes.  
 
However, these results only present average impact per group, which hides the fact that the 
variation within each income group is substantial. An income tax will, by definition, affect 
everyone with the same income in the same way. A car use tax is different: even if it is 
progressive “on average”, there may still be individuals who are hurt disproportionately 
relative to their income. In fact, a more detailed analysis shows that the share suffering 
substantial welfare losses relative to their income is much higher in low income groups than 
in high income groups – despite that the average welfare loss relative to income is lower in 
the lower income groups. This is especially true for low income groups in rural areas. This 
may explain the feeling that car use taxes hurt the poor disproportionately: not that they are 
regressive on average, but that the share who suffer substantial welfare losses relative to their 
income are higher in lower income groups. That this point seems to be underappreciated is 
partly a data issue: exploring the variation within groups requires large data sets, and is often 
impossible without access to registry data, since survey- or modelling-based data sets are 
usually not sufficiently large.  
 
The argument that members of a group should be affected equally is sometimes called 
“horizontal equity”. How this argument should be applied in the context of car use taxes 
depends on the purpose of the tax, as argued in the introduction, since this implies how 
“groups” should be defined. If the purpose is primarily to generate public revenues, it is 
natural to define “groups” as income segments, and consider distributional effects across and 
within income groups. If the purpose is to correct the price of car trips, on the other hand, it is 
natural to define “groups” according to how much people drive, and distributional effects 
across and within income segments are much less relevant.  
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3.2 Example: congestion pricing 
Stockholm introduced congestion charges in 2006, first as a trial, and permanently from 2007. 
The charging system consisted of a cordon around the inner city, with charges varying 
between 2€ in peak hours and 1 € before and after the peaks (nights and weekends are free of 
charge). The system was slightly revised in 2016, when peak charges were increased and one 
charging point was added, but the analysis presented here refers to the original system.  
 
 
Figure 2 shows average congestion charges paid per person across the income range, and  
 
Figure 3 shows the same as a proportion of monthly income. The data comes from a travel 
survey (RVU 2015). Income is self-reported total household income before tax, divided by 
the number of adults in the household. Revenue recycling is not considered. The payment 
distribution is smoothed through kernel estimation (a generalization of the “moving averages” 
method).  
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 Figure 2. Average congestion charges paid per person and day (kernel estimation).  
 
 
Figure 3. Average congestion charges paid per person and day relative to monthly income (per mille) (kernel 
estimation).  
Average congestion charge payments per person are almost proportional to income, except for 
the lowest and highest incomes. As before, results for the lowest income groups should be 
treated with caution, since these incomes are so low that they can hardly reflect available 
economic resources. In the highest income range, it is as if car use almost reaches a saturation 
level where it no longer increases with income, and hence payments as a share of income falls 
somewhat for the highest income range.   
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 Figure 3 that the Stockholm charge is slightly regressive, since charge payments as a share of 
income falls slowly with income: the overall Suits index is -0.09. It is also clear from the 
figures that the slight regressivity is almost entirely due the results at the extremes of the 
income range, whereas for most of the income range, charge payments are roughly 
proportionally to income. Just as for the fuel tax, however, these averages obscure the fact the 
variation with an income group is substantial.  
 
Analyzing charge payments geographically (not shown here) shows that the congestion 
charge is more regressive for residents close to the charging zone – especially for residents 
within the inner city – while it is progressive for residents further away from the zone. This 
illustrates that the geographical distribution of socioeconomic groups and travel patterns 
matter, and hence results will differ between cities with different socioeconomic spatial 
distributions.    
4 A sample of empirical results 
The distributional effects of any consumption tax will depend on the local context, and car use 
taxes are no different. Table 1 shows a sample of empirical studies of distributional effects of 
fuel taxes, illustrating a representative range of results summarized by Suits indices. In rich 
countries, fuel taxes tend to be slightly regressive, but the regressivity decreases if 
expenditures are used instead of income as a measure of individuals’ economic resources. In 
poor countries, fuel taxes tend to be progressive, and this progressivity also tends to decrease 
when expenditures are used as a measure of individuals’ economic resources. Taking second-
order effects of fuel taxes into account affect results mostly to a small extent.  
 
Country Income, 
excl. second-
order effects 
Income, 
incl. second-
order effects 
Expenditures, 
excl. second-
order effects 
Expenditures, 
incl. second-
order effects 
Source 
France -0.155 -0.157 -0.021 -0.024 Sterner (2012) 
Germany -0.066 -0.067 0.009 0.008 Sterner (2012) 
Italy   -0.110 -0.110 Sterner (2012) 
Serbia 0.187 0.172 0.066 0.055 Sterner (2012) 
Spain -0.086 -0.086 -0.002 -0.002 Sterner (2012) 
Sweden -0.171 -0.178 0.072 0.064 Sterner (2012) 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.123 -0.125 -0.003 -0.004 Sterner (2012) 
Texas (US)  -0.25    CPPP (2007) 
Costa Rica 0.09 -0.01   Blackman, Osakwe 
and Alpizar (2010) 
Sweden -0.03    Eliasson, Pyddoke and 
Swärdh (2018) 
Chile 0.05  0.17  Agostini and Jiménez 
(2015)  
Table 1. Suits indices for fuel taxes from empirical studies.  
5 Conclusions  
Car use taxes have repeatedly been shown to be very effective policies to reduce emissions 
and congestion. Few if any policies can compete in terms of effectiveness, and probably none 
in terms of economic efficiency.   
 
The distributional consequences of car use taxes will obviously depend on their design and 
the local context. It is clear, however, that rich groups will pay considerably more per person 
than poor groups. Considering payments as a share of income, results are more mixed, but 
broadly speaking, average payments tend to be approximately proportional to income, but 
slightly regressive in rich countries and slightly progressive in poor countries. The overall 
regressivity tends be caused by the outliers: the highest and lowest income groups do not 
drive quite proportionally to their (registered) income level.  
 
Variation within income groups is often substantial, however. Car use taxes also tend to place 
a higher burden on residents in rural areas, satellite cities and urban peripheries, which may 
counteract societal goals to make such areas more attractive. If the purpose of a car use tax is 
to generate revenues for public expenditures, variation with income groups, higher burdens in 
rural areas and slight regressivity may be viewed as serious problems. After all, it is difficult 
to defend that poor or rural people should contribute more than proportionally to public 
expenditures. In this respect, income or general sales taxes can be viewed as more fair, since 
these by construction takes an equal amount from everyone with the same level of income or 
consumption, respectively.  
 
However, it is much less clear that such distributional effects are relevant if the purpose of a 
car use tax is to correct the prices of car trips to make them better reflect their full social cost, 
by for example internalizing the cost of congestion or carbon emissions. Prices of goods and 
services are usually equal for everyone, for good reasons (most importantly that it leaves it up 
to individuals themselves to decide how to allocate their resources). Problems with 
inequitable income and wealth distributions are instead usually (and preferably) handled with 
general taxes and the social welfare system. Allowing prices of car trips to be lower than their 
social cost (which they will be in the absence of car use taxes) effectively constitutes 
subsidies to car drivers from society at large, and these implicit subsidies will 
overwhelmingly accrue to rich groups. From this perspective, the burden of proof from a 
distributional point of view lies not on those who want to introduce corrective car use taxes, 
but on those who defend a situation where car use is effectively subsidized by society. This is 
of course an even more pressing problem in countries where the price of car fuel is actually 
subsidized with public money.  
 
Obviously, it can be difficult in practice to figure out whether a particular car use tax should 
be viewed primarily as a price correction or primarily as a source of public revenue. 
Nevertheless, the two perspectives are important to keep in mind when drawing conclusions 
from an analysis. 
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